Can pariah states change their spots?
By Neill Lochery
July 24, 2002
Two issues currently dominate the Middle East: a possible American
attack on Iraq, and the attempts to raise the bar in terms of
political reform within the Palestinian Authority. The two issues
are closely related. Both are viewed by the Arabs as unwelcome
attempts at Western intervention in the region (code for imperialism),
and as having pro-Israel sentiments behind them. From an American
perspective it is easy to see how both issues fit into the wider
picture of post-September 11th foreign policy that has been characterized
by a clearer set of Middle Eastern policy goals.
In simple terms, the Middle East has become to U.S. President
George W. Bush what the Cold War was to President Reagan and his
father, namely a struggle between good and evil -- defined here
as moderate and pariah (rogue). In reality, if the current U.S.
administration is to have any chance of success in the region
it must be consistent in removing all the rogues and dictators
that dominate its politics. Margaret Thatcher, who still knows
a thing or two about international relations, is adamant that
the removal of Saddam, while a welcome move, would not be sufficient
to reform the region. So does the call for the replacement of
Yasser Arafat merely mark the next logical step of U.S. regional
policy?
Presently, the wider debate among right-wingers in the United
States is about how many of the totalitarian regimes in the region
should be included in this removal list. The hawks favour a list
that includes President Asad of Syria, the Iranian leadership
and Colonel Gadaffi of Libya. More moderate right-wingers argue
that the removal of Saddam Hussein is the only action that the
United States should undertake, hoping for the "domino effect"
that characterized the fall of Communism. This view is worrying
for even after Saddam's departure, which is by no means assured,
radical regimes will not give up the fight against the "imperialist
forces" of the West. Indeed, the opposite will be true. Israel
and the United States will be used even more than ever as an excuse
for all the ills -- economic and political -- of these pariah
states. In practical terms this will be translated into rationales
for the continued high levels of spending on armed forces by these
regimes which, in reality, keep these leaders in power. In short,
a move against Iraq that is not backed up by similar actions against
other pariah states will increase -- not reduce -- the intensity
of the conflict.
Accepting the need to target all pariah states, what is more
difficult to calculate is the likely long-term fallout of a successful
U.S. campaign. This is the area in which the current Bush administration
appears to have little understanding.
Taking the Ba'ath regimes in Iraq and Syria as examples, both
are ethnic minority tribes ruling over a wider population by means
of fear and coercion. Both also have been known to use brutal
force against any internal opposition groups, including the use
of chemical weapons. Crucially, both have been in power for so
long that they have expertly removed the major opposition figures
from the scene. As a result, there are no clear viable, and moderate,
alternative leaderships to the current despots. Consequently,
even if any U.S. action proved successful, we would likely be
left with the Romanian model of political change: where the leader
changes, but the ideology remains relatively intact.
Clearly, the key to a politically stable and more economically
prosperous Middle East lies in encouraging states such as Iraq
and Syria to join the global economic market. Programs of wide-ranging
economic liberalization urgently need to be implemented.
Sadly, it is difficult to foresee any likely replacement to Saddam
or Asad undertaking such actions due to continued anti-Western
feeling and fear of the effects of the social costs on their administrations'
prospects. Without economic improvement there can be no political
advancement.
President Bush, clearly buoyed by the relatively successful transition
of power in Afghanistan, appears willing to take the chance with
Iraq that it will not all be in vein. Let's hope that any U.S.
action will lead to a new regime with a new ideology in Baghdad
(but somehow I doubt it). Sadly, social and political advancement
will not happen overnight in Iraq, Syria or the Palestinian Authority.
Indeed getting rid of Saddam, Asad and Arafat could prove to be
the easy part of the job. It is correct for President Bush to
at least try to help reform the Middle East. The challenge, however,
of forcing political reform upon reluctant, well-entrenched and
ruthless leaderships could prove as difficult as ending the Cold
War was for President Reagan, and for Mr. Bush's father.
Dr Neill Lochery is Director of the Centre for Israeli Studies
at University College, London
This article was originally published in the National
Post on July 24, 2002
