A way to reassure the Israeli public
By Neill Lochery
December 16, 2002
The speech by Ariel Sharon at the recent security conference
held in Herzliya made headlines across the globe. By publicly
agreeing to the creation of a limited Palestinian state the prime
minister seemingly embraced the Roadmap Peace Plan put forward
by the Bush administration.
Of far greater interest, however, was Sharon's attempt to formally
introduce the issue of decommissioning as one of the major preconditions
for Palestinian statehood.
Decommissioning, or the voluntary hand-over of illegally held
arms, has been the most divisive issue in the Northern Irish peace
process for years. To outsiders it has appeared strange that consecutive
Israeli governments have done little more than pay lip service
to this key ingredient of peace.
Critics of decommissioning argue that its military and security
value is limited and that the political repercussions of insisting
upon it far outweigh any potential security value.
Furthermore, they argue, organizations that have decommissioned
can always get new arms. With the current glut of weapons available
on the black market it has never been easier or cheaper to rearm
within a relatively short period.
The political consequences of insisting upon decommissioning
as a precondition for a political settlement are clearly shown
by the Northern Irish case. Here the term decommissioning has
been interpreted by paramilitary groups from both sides of the
community as meaning surrender.
Groups such as the Provisional IRA argue that they have not lost
the low-intensity war with the British army, so why should they
hand over their weapons prior to the implementation of a political
settlement? They talk in terms of a demilitarized Northern Ireland
in which all the arms are removed from the country (code for the
withdrawal of British forces from the area).
Even accepting the merit of the arguments against putting decommissioning
center-stage, these critics miss its central role: its use as
a confidence-building mechanism. The major value of decommissioning
lies in reassuring both political leaderships and the wider public
that long-running wars conducted by such groups as the IRA are
effectively over.
Confidence in this belief is a vital ingredient in building support
for peace agreements that always involve varying degrees of painful
concessions and leaps into the unknown.
Given the recent history of Israel, which has seen a marked increase
in terrorist casualties since it signed peace agreements with
the Palestinians, comprehensive and genuine Palestinian decommissioning
must take place before Israel offers any additional political
concessions.
HERE THE cases of Northern Ireland and Israel diverge. Under
the terms of the Oslo Accords Israel actually allowed the PLO
to effectively arm itself. Those who have read the small print
of the accords will have noted that the PLO was permitted to arm
its security forces with only light weapons for domestic security
purposes. Instead Yasser Arafat and his ad-hoc security forces
stockpiled weapons to prepare for war with Israel.
By using an extensive system of tunnels (some known to Israeli
forces but others newly created) the PLO has turned the West Bank
and Gaza Strip into two of the most heavily armed areas on the
globe. This has been made all the easier by the willingness of
third parties such as Iran to deliver weapons and foot the bill.
Sharon was therefore correct to insist upon third-party involvement
in the collection and destruction of the illegally held Palestinian
arms. Worryingly, however, he did not appear to insist upon third-party
verification of the level and whereabouts of the arms.
In Northern Ireland a Canadian general was placed in charge of
overseeing the complete decommissioning process of the IRA. Surely
it would be prudent to attempt to locate Palestinian arms dumps
using a third party, for it remains highly unlikely that the Palestinians
will choose to do the job themselves.
Perhaps the most delicate issue to be addressed by Israel and
the outside world regarding decommissioning concerns the levels
of weapons the Palestinians be allowed to keep.
It is impractical to suggest that all illegal weapons be collected,
and here Sharon's insistence on the dismantling of all Palestinian
security bodies is very interesting. His suggestion that they
be replaced with two or three new organizations consisting of
a new police force and two security services presents an opportunity
to at least verify and license the weapons such new organizations
would be allowed to keep. Once again it would have to be job for
a third party such as the CIA.
Sharon needs to learn from the Northern Irish experience how
best to insist upon decommissioning, which, although vital to
the prospect of peaceful coexistence, remains very difficult to
fully achieve in practical and political terms.
The Israeli public, however, needs reassurance that there can
be no repeat of the current levels of violence being directed
against it during a potential post-political settlement period.
The writer is director of the Center for Israeli Studies
at University College, London.
This article was originally published in the Jerusalem
Post on December 16, 2002
